Reading: Dooyeweerd's Theory of Reality

We did some real digging last time into the beginnings of the theory of reality that Professor delivered proposed as a non-reductionist ontology. It's an example. And I want to mention to you that, although I think it's a good example and I'm going to go ahead with it and explain more about it, one of the first things that he said to me when we chatted about it was, "All my theories may need to be changed or abandoned. A theory is just a theory." So if you want to know what to read, if any of us want to know what a non-reductionist argument could look like, well, here's an example. Is it the only one? Is it absolutely right? No. Like all other theories, it's an explanatory guess that we make. And then we offer supporting reasons. And he was perfectly aware of all that and very humble about his accomplishment.

Let's go ahead with that. First, let's review a few things to make sure we've got it down. The term "aspect" now has a special meaning, right? It's a basic kind of property that's related to one another by laws or norms. A "norm" might be that the most probable thing that's going to happen if you violate it is this, but it's not absolutely certain. Norms we can break; laws are rigid, we can't break them, even if we wished we could. We have basic kinds of properties and laws, and "basic" means it can't be eliminated by any other aspect. On this note, could there be more than just these? Maybe we've missed one, and we need to add something to the list that isn't on it. This list isn't beyond question or correction; we're just starting where our experience starts.

These things exhibit all these kinds of properties. There have been different philosophical theories in the history of the subject that have taken some one or another of these to be the string that ties all the beads together. None of them can so much as be conceived by us as having independent existence. We can't even conceive of it that way. If you can't conceive of it that way, you can't produce evidence that it is that way. Then, we saw what this aspect list is. And I want to make the point that if you get persnickety about the list, we don't have to have this list. My claim is that this theory of reality works and explains just as well if you have a slightly different list.

We said before that things function under the laws or the laws of creation. These are aspects which are basic kinds of properties and laws. Now, where do the laws come from? They come from God. They come from the same place all the properties come from. God's the law-giver to creation. So it's God who has set up his creation so that there are laws that are mathematical, spatial, kinetic, physical, and biological. And it's God who's built norms into the creation. The most important norms that we think of and speak of are real norms. The norm for ethics says that you should love your neighbor as yourself. The norm for justice is that we're to be just in our dealings and fair with other people.

These kinds of properties and laws are true of all the things in the world. One way to think of things is that they possess properties of all these kinds, either actively or passively. It's the view that everything has properties, or some properties, of every kind - either actively, passively, or both. So, in reality, there is nothing that's wholly non-physical. There's nothing in reality that's completely unethical, that has no ethical ramifications, or even potentially has an ethical property. All things possess every kind of property. They can manifest these properties in two ways: actively and passively.

Last time, we illustrated this with the example of a rock. The rock functions actively in the quantitative, spatial, kinetic, and physical aspects. Conversely, it is merely passive in other aspects. For instance, it can have passive biological functions; it can be passively perceived and conceived; it could undergo historical formation; it can be represented in language, and it can have a social significance. Consider if I place the rock here as a seat for someone to sit on during tea. This gives it a social function. It might also be economically valuable.

When considering the justice aspect, I coined the term "justicewill" from Dooyeweerd's original term "juridical". It refers to justice. But perhaps there's a better term. Regardless, things also possess aesthetic and ethical properties. For the final property, I chose "fiduciary", referring to trustworthiness. At its highest degree, this relates to what people regard as divine, connecting it to religious motivations.

Contrast the rock with, say, a plant in my garden. This plant has active properties in the quantitative, spatial, kinetic, physical, and biotic modes because it's alive and conducts metabolic functions. Now consider a clam. It's not only biotically active but also senses its environment, sensing food or potential threats. But it has passive functions in other aspects.

Humans, to our knowledge, are the only beings with active functions in every aspect. They interact with every kind of property under every kind of law and norm. This comprehensive interaction is what differentiates humans. To consider a human as only passive, especially in the economic aspect, is to reduce them to mere commodities, akin to endorsing slavery. This is not only morally wrong but also undermines our understanding of reality.

This theory of reality proposes that each property or aspect has a defining function. Our goal is to discern the nature of things, to understand their inherent qualities. Unlike some theories that simplify everything into a singular core essence, this theory embraces the multifaceted nature of reality.

Consider a hammer: It's a tool, an artifact. It's both the result of humans crafting natural materials and a device made to shape other materials. This object is qualified historically. Here's where our theory diverges from the likes of Aristotle. With a rock, plant, clam, or humans, we're discussing natural entities. But how do we address artifacts?

Consider a table crafted from wood. It serves a social purpose, facilitating conversations or lectures. When examining artifacts, we discern two things: the laws that governed its formation and its intended purpose. A table, for instance, is formed historically but serves a social function.

Similarly, when you think of a 747 airplane, it's an artifact designed for a purpose: to transport passengers at high speeds. Its foundation is historical, being crafted by humans from natural materials, but its primary purpose, from an owner's perspective, might be economic. Thus, by understanding both the foundation and purpose of an artifact, we gain insights into its inherent nature.

The ultimate goal of this theory is to explain the nature of things. Whether it's a turtle, a rock, a tree, a table, or a 747 airplane, each has its unique nature. This intricate chart serves as our guide to understanding the complexities of our world.

But it does show us that there are things that are qualified by something that is their leading function. This is what leads their formation, in which the thing functions only passively. So unlike natural things that function actively in a certain number of aspects and then passively in the rest, and whose nature is qualified by the highest thing that acts actively, artifacts are qualified by a function in which they are passive.

So, it's true that the 747 doesn't buy and sell trips; it gets bought and sold. It's passive economically. Similarly, tables are passive socially. The table doesn't chit-chat with us or carry on the conversation. It doesn't have tea with us. It's part of what we use to have tea and chit-chat, and so on. And so there are many, many kinds of artifacts as we can find, and most of them have a historical foundation. One that doesn't, for instance, is marriage.

Now, human social communities are also going to be artifacts. Humans form them, no question. But they differ in their nature. They will sometimes have a different foundational function and a different leading function. For example, a marriage is founded on the biological nature of men and women; it's based on the sexual difference. So marriage arises out of the biological interests, we say, of the biological aspect of our lives and the desire to reproduce. That's its foundational function. Its leading function, however, would be ethical. Why? Because it's founded in love. So while it's founded in our biological nature, what leads its formation and should guide its development and continuance is love.

Some other institutions, such as a school, would be historically founded. And then I would say they are led by logic, the logical aspect. We form concepts, teach concepts, convey concepts, and attempt to make new concepts. By conveying knowledge conceptually, we are giving someone an education. That's different from training somebody. An institution that trains somebody may be historically founded, but the training may be qualified by some other aspect than the logical. We don't learn mainly how to conceive of things; we learn to perform a certain task. Once we've learned to do it well, the training is over, whether we understand it or not. This allows for a lot of nuance and a lot of difference in the natures things exhibit. It doesn't put everything in one bucket to begin with and then strain like crazy to force everything in when it doesn't fit. We approach reality and find things the way they are, identifying the kind of nature they exhibit. This is one way to typify them. This isn't the end of this theory of reality; there are other pieces to it, and I'm about to discuss some of them.

Now, one of the things that we have talked about is the different kinds of properties and laws that things exhibit. We find them to have properties, and these properties conform to regularities that we call laws. Examples of these regularities include E=mc^2 and the fact that nothing can appear both blue and red all over at the same time. These are necessary truths that have to do with the properties of each kind. But that's not all this theory postulates. It also suggests what I've called "type laws."

If you remember, Plato and Aristotle were concerned with how matter is organized in different ways: here as a tree, there as a horse, and elsewhere as a human being. They proposed that forms, eternal uncreated definitions, impacted the matter and created imperfect instances of whatever the definition was.

Similarly, we can ask about the natures of things. When we find that a plant is biologically qualified, what is it that made it possible for all its parts and properties to combine into just this type of thing? The theory postulates that there are also type laws, as well as aspectual laws. These type laws govern how different kinds of properties combine into one unified thing. So, instead of eternal forms, there are type laws for various kinds of things: trees, frogs, and so on.

To understand the nature of something, if it's a natural thing, we look at its qualifying function. This is how we differentiate between minerals, vegetables, and animals. But if you want to delve deeper into the nature of something, you search for its type law, which governs how parts and properties of all different kinds can be combined.

This leads to a subtle distinction. There's a difference between something being made possible by a type law and something for which there is no type law. For example, a flying carpet isn't possible because there's no type law allowing its formation. This is distinct from something being impossible because it violates a known law. So there's a difference between "impossible" and "not possible."

I believe this theory, while complex and nuanced, provides a comprehensive way to understand reality. It offers hundreds of pages of examples and answers various problems. It's more than just a way to typify reality; it offers a comprehensive social theory, which I will delve into further in our next discussion. But before that, there's another topic on my mind that I'd like to address.

This subject has to do with social organizations, communities, of every kind, which are formed by humans and are therefore artifacts. That means that they will have a foundational function. Most all of them, it's historical, it's just our ability to take natural materials and make something new of it. Except for marriage. And the leading functions vary with the law which aspects laws govern the internal operations or organization of the social community that we're talking about.

So, for example, let's look at some concrete examples. We had marriage founded by articlea. And then qualified by the ethical because it's guided and based upon love. We could have, let's say, a business that is founded in the historical just our ability to organize and then is qualified by the economic - it's for the purpose of making a living. Or we could say that something is historically founded. And it's a church. And it's qualified then by that last by fiduciary, or what's most trustworthy would be the aspect of faith. So, here are examples of three different kinds of communities: marriage, business, and church. And they have different natures.

It's important in all of this, also to combine this with a point that I did make earlier and it's worth repeating here. Humans are never parts of social organizations. This is because a human being doesn't have a qualifying function at all. Humans are led by what they believe, particularly by what they believe to be divine. But human beings don't have a qualifying function because there is no law of any kind that determines human action and activity. This is another way to say humans have freewill. They also have freedom of judgment.

The viewpoints, the philosophies that hold that humans don't have free will, are giving you an argument like this: They give you some reasons or other. For these reasons, the conclusion is, we have no freedom of judgment or choice. But if you really have no freedom of judgment or choice, then those aren't reasons to believe it. If we have no freedom to arrive at conclusions for reasons, then we're not free. We're not free in the choices we make. Somehow, it's in our genes that just forces us to believe this, or the way we were potty trained, or whatever it's supposed to be. These reasons show that we don't have that kind of judgment; then there are no such reasons. You don't know that to be true. All you know is that you can't help but see it as true. So the argument for determinism defeats itself.

The argument that says that we have no such freedom could only be known to be true if we didn't have the freedom. If we don't have the freedom, then you're not coming to that conclusion for reasons or good judgment. You're coming to that conclusion because the reasons compelled you to it. It doesn't matter whether it's your genetic makeup, your nature, or nurture. If it undercuts freewill and undercuts all judgment, then no theory is any good; no theory has any justification more than any other theory. In that case, this very conclusion is no more compelling for us than the story of The Three Bears.

So that's another side light to this: human beings have a nature that spans all of the aspects. Humans are active and passive in every aspect and, on top of that, have genuine freedom of judgment and choice. It is, nevertheless, true that although humans are active in every aspect, and have genuine freedom of judgment and choice, that can be impacted. It's not true that that's absolute and is unaffected by anything else. People can become addicted, for example, and have their normal freedom of judgment and choice overridden by the compulsion of the addiction. That's an extreme case. But one has to be really badly addicted for that to take away judgment. It may very well be the case that someone in the throes of deep addiction still knows it's bad for them to take the drug. It doesn't stop their judgment; it just takes away their choice of action. So in extreme cases, that can happen. But a normal human being is someone who has freedom of judgment and choice and can say no when the proper choice is no.

Now, all of this is just preliminary to this theory of reality. I can't go into very great lengths because to make it more detailed would require more background knowledge than I've been able to give you in these talks or assume you have from elsewhere. What I am going to do is recommend some books that introduce this stuff. If you're interested, you can read up more about it. My own book called "The Myth of Religious Neutrality" has three chapters on this theory of reality. There's another book called "Contours of a Christian Philosophy" by a man named Cosby that goes into more detail than I do. And for those of you who are a bit more advanced, there is a work called "Philosophy: Discipline of the Disciplines" by my friend Donnie Strauss. He delves into more detail, especially regarding math and physics.

So I think that's about all I should do with you in sketching out what a non-reductionist theory of reality might look like. Notice that in all these examples that I've given you, we're not assuming things have the same nature. We're looking at different natures, accounting for them as we find them, and as we form them, honoring the real differences. Not trying to jam them into a preconceived notion.

Now, there is an orderliness to this chart that I want to point out. These aspects I wrote down in an order that reflects what we seem to experience. Each one on the list presupposes the earlier ones. Remember, these are kinds of properties and laws, not kinds of objects. None of these cause each other. It's not the case that quantitative properties somehow produce spatial properties; that doesn't make any sense. All of these are true for the things of the world around us. And they all have to be there and be that way because God puts them there. Not because any one of them makes all the others or any two of them interact to make all the other kinds of properties. Properties don't cause anything.

They are related, so that sometimes properties in one aspect are causally involved in the appearance of some properties in another. Let's take a physical and sensory example: a heated copper wire that glows green. Is that a case of a physical property causing a sensory one? Heating the copper wire makes physical changes that do bring about the green glow. So physical heat is part of the story. But they are not the reason there are such things as green glows in the universe. If there were no sensory aspect with its properties and laws, you could heat the wire all you want, but it's not going to glow any color because it has no color. When I say that one aspect doesn't produce another, I mean that globally. It is not the case that one aspect wholesale brings into existence another kind of properties and laws. But in detail, properties of one aspect can change and become the occasion for properties in another also, an important difference.